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Contemporary emphasis on legislation as a remedy for Can­
ada’s environmental ills has unfortunately tended to overshadow 
another important curative device useful to the environmental 
laywer, the common law action in nuisance.1 Historically the 
nuisance suit has been seen by the Bar as the most appropriate 
of common and civil law remedies for phenomena we would today 
describe as environmental problems.2 In 1611 distraught citizens 
were using nuisance as a means of relief from pollution.3 The 
action’s availability for environmental protection has continued 
to the present day.
There are two distinct kinds of nuisance action, public and 
private. This paper will examine public and private nuisance law 
as to its nature and applicability to environmental problems. The 
two branches of nuisance law will first be examined individually, 
to point out their peculiarities, then collectively, from the stand­
point of defences to them and remedies they may afford.
t  The author is a third year law student at the University o f New Brunswick; 
this article originally was prepared for a seminar course in Law and the En­
vironment.
1 See J.P.S. McLaren. “The Common Law Nuisance A ctions and the Environ­
mental Battle-Well Tem pered Swords or Broken R eeds?” (1972), 10 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 505.
2 See ibid.; and L.S. Fink. “Canadian Law and Aircraft Noise Disturbance: 
A Comparative Study o f American, British and Canadian Law” (1965), 11 
M cGill L.J. 55; and R .l. Cohen. “Nuisance: Proprietary D erelict” (1968), 14 
M cGill L.J. 124.
3 William A lfred's Case (1611), 77 E.R. 816 (K.B.)
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PUBLIC NUISANCE
Until the sixteenth century only criminal actions were allowed 
for activities involving public nuisance/ Such misdeeds as keeping 
a brothel, emitting foul smoke, and polluting water5 were only 
actionable at the suit of the Attorney-General.6 During the six­
teenth century, however, there developed a private public nui­
sance action to provide relief against activities of those types. This 
action was allowable when the plaintiff suffered . a greater 
hurt than everyman had.”7
Thus today it has come to be that a private citizen’s damages 
in public nuisance must be ‘particularly distinct’ from that suffered 
by the general public, otherwise only the Attorney-General can 
bring the suit.8 The only other possible public nuisance action 
is a ‘relator-action’, where the Attorney-General acts on the infor­
mation of a plaintiff. The action is taken in the names of both 
the plaintiff and the Attorney-General.9
Standing to sue is best obtained with the support of the 
Attorney-General, but that support may not be given readily, 
especially when economic interests are involved.10 ‘Standing’ for 
a strictly private action in public nuisance can be achieved in two 
ways. First, if the plaintiff has suffered damage to his land he may 
have standing to sue for public nuisance. However, damage to land 
will also be grounds for a private nuisance suit and it is the latter 
course of action that is usually taken.11
4 See J.G. Fleming, The Law o f  Torts (4th ed. 1971) at p. 340.
5 As to what makes an offence “against the public" see A lt.-G en . v. Haney 
S peedw ays  (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 48 and A lt.-G en . v. P .Y .A . Quarries Ltd., 
(1957) 1 All E.R. 894.
6 See Fleming, op. cit. p. 339.
7 Ibid.. p. 340.
8 See Crim inal C o d e . R.S.C. 1972, ch. C-34. s. 176.
9 M cL eod  v. White (1955), 37 M.P.R. 341 at 355, and A tt.-G en. v. Ewen  (1895),
3 B.C.R. 468 (B.C.S.C.).
10 See Fleming, op. cit., p. 341, and the Judicature A c t. R.S.N.B. 1952, ch. 120, 
s. 35.
11 See Cairns v. Canadian Refining Co. (1914), 26 O.W .R. 490 (C.A.); McLaren, 
op. cit., p. 517. Also see A.W . Reitze, E nvironm ental Law  (2nd ed., 1972), 
at pp. 5-25. who thinks it may som etim es be easier to prove public nuisance 
based on an invasion of land rights than it is to prove private nuisance based 
on such an invasion.
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The second way of getting standing to sue is that already 
referred to, where the plaintiff has suffered ‘particular damage’, 
different from that suffered by the rest of the public. A major prob­
lem which one may encounter in this connection stems from the 
uncertainty as to what is meant by ‘particular damage’.
J.G. Fleming12 thinks ‘particular damage’ is damage different 
in degree from that suffered by the general public.13 Professor 
Prosser,14 on the other hand, maintains that ‘particular damage’ 
must be different in degree and in kind from that of the general 
public.15 Canadian decisions to date seem to support Prosser but 
the question is still not finally settled.16
Another stumbling-block with the ‘particular damage’ require­
ment is the question as to whether the damage must be direct or 
simply consequential. Prosser and Fleming state that it does not 
matter whether it is direct or consequential,17 but one of the most 
recent Canadian decisions on public nuisance law held that the 
damage must be direct.18 The decision has been severely criticized 
on this point and the issue may still be open in Canada.19
The public nuisance suit has other peculiarities. A class action 
is not maintainable for public nuisance20 even though the interests 
of a number of complainants may be similar.21 Nevertheless, it 
may be possible to join the actions of several plaintiffs on the basis 
that they have common questions of law or fact to be decided.22
12 See Fleming, op. cit., at p. 341.
13 Ibid.. p. 342.
14 See W. L. Prosser. “Private Action for Public Nuisance” (1966), 52 Virginia 
L. R. 997. at p. 1011.
15 Ibid.. at pp. 1012. 1015. 1017. 1018. and 1022.
16 See McLaren, op. cit.. p. 514; A.R. Lucas. “Environmental Control Through 
Civil A ctions” in B.C. Annual Law Lectures (Victoria. 1970) 20; and W. Estey, 
“Public Nuisance and Standing to Sue" (1972). 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 563 at 
p. 572.
17 See Prosser, op. cit.. at p. 1007.
18 H ickey  v. E lectric Reduction  Co. (1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 368 (Nfld. S.C.), 
and see M cR ae  v. British Norwegian Whaling Co. Ltd., 11927-31) Nfld. L.R. 
274.
19 See McLaren, op. cit., p. 513, and Estey, op. cit., p. 572.
20 St. Lawrence Rendering Co. v. Cornwall, (1951) 4 D.L.R. 790.
21 Preston  v. Hilton  (1920). 647.
22 McLaren, op. cit. p. 519, and N.B. R ules o f  Court, 1969, 0 .1 6 , r.9.
24 U.N.B. L A W  JOURNAL
Finally, in order to bring a successful public nuisance suit, 
one must prove that the damage caused out-weighs the public 
utility of the act causing damage.13 This factor, which can be a 
formidable burden, will be discussed more fully under the head of 
‘private nuisance’.
As the law stands now, public nuisance actions are limited 
tools for environmental protectionists. Beyond the problems al­
ready outlined, courts are reluctant to allow public nuisance ac­
tions because they profess to fear a ‘flood of claims’.24 Proof of 
this reticence is marked in Canada where courts have recently held 
that financial loss is not loss that would satisfy the requirements 
of ‘particular damage’!25 In spite of this, our courts may see fit in 
the future to widen the ambit of public nuisance law in the light of 
environmental concern and current legal views in other juris­
dictions.26
PRIVATE NUISANCE
The private nuisance action is an old common law remedy.27 
Basically concerned with invasions of an occupier’s interest in the 
beneficial use and enjoyment of land, it is, like trespass, a tort 
action that need not involve any physical damage to land. But, 
unlike trespass, it rarely involves physical intrusions. Normally, 
private nuisance entails ‘consequential infringement’ of rights to 
land.28
There are two requisites for standing to sue in a private nui­
sance suit: there must be either ‘physical injury’ to land29 or dam­
23 See Reitze, op. cit.. pp. 5-25, where he questions whether this doctrine applies 
as much here as it does with private nuisance.
24 See Filion v. N.B. International Paper Co., (1934) 3 D.L.R. 22 at p. 26.
25 See H ickey  v. E lectric R eduction Co., op. cit., pp. 370-71. A lso see Filion 
v. N.B. International Paper Co., ibid., p. 96. But see the earlier case of Rainy 
R iver Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Ontario & M innesota P ow er Co. (1914), 17 D.L.R. 
850, where loss o f money was seen to be “particular damage”.
26 See McLaren, op. cit. p. 515, and P.R. Ehrlich and A.H. Ehrlich Population, 
Resources, Environm ent: Issues in Human E cology  (San Francisco. 1972) 
at p. 365.
27 See Fleming, op. cit., p. 338.
28 Ibid ., p. 344.
29 R iver Park Enterprises v. Town o f  Fort St. John (1965), 62 D.L.R. (2d) 519 
(B.C.S.C.) where the lowering in value o f a property by a “sensible material" 
injury was held to be a physical injury.
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age to the use and enjoyment of land,30 and the person bringing the 
action must be an occupier of the land affected.31 In sharp con­
trast with the ‘standing criteria’ for the public nuisance action, the 
foregoing are relatively easy to meet. Nevertheless, there are some 
problems in bringing a private nuisance suit to court.
As with the ‘public suit’, class actions are not permitted but, 
it will be remembered, one may join the suits of several plaintiffs 
if they have similar questions of law or fact to be decided.32
There is some uncertainty as to the nature and extent of the 
plaintiffs burden of proof. Private nuisance is somewhat akin to 
strict liability in that it does not depend on proof of negligence.33 
However, there is law to the effect that private nuisance is not 
‘strict’ in the sense that no other factors are to be considered in 
proof. It is uncertain what these other factors are. In the final 
analysis it seems that the proponents of this view demand an ‘ar­
ticulation of the defendant’s fault’34 whereas conventional theor­
ists assume it. In ‘conventional Canada’ therefore, it appears safe 
to presume that neither reasonable care35 nor lack of knowledge36 
on the defendant’s part will absolve him of liability in a nuisance 
action.
It has been held almost consistently that the acts complained 
of must have continued for a significant period in order to support 
a private nuisance suit.37 However, there is some authority in 
Canada to the effect that an activity of even short duration can be 
sufficient.38
Another factor with which a plaintiff may have to contend is 
that of ‘relative neighborhood’.39 The sense of this concept is 
that a person has no right to complain of nuisance if he or she has
30 Fleming, op. cit., p. 345.
31 Billingsgate Fish Ltd. v. B.C. Sugar Refining Co. (1933), 46 B.C.R. 543 
(B.C.S.C.).
32 See footnote 22.
33 McLaren, op. cit., p. 521.
34 Ibid., p. 522; also see Fleming, op. cit., p. 353.
35 Drysdale  v. Ducas (18%), 26 S.C.R. 20.
36 Portage La Prairie v. B.C. Pea G row ers L td ., ( 1966] S.C.R. 150. See also Esco  
v. Fort H enry H otel (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 206.
37 See Reitze, op. cit., pp. 5-25.
38 A ldridge  v. Van Patter, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 93.
39 See L ockw ood  v. B ren tw ood Park Investm ents Ltd. (1970), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 
143 at p. 165. Also see H ousten  v. Brown-H older Biscuits Ltd. ( 1936), 10 M.P.R. 
544 (N.B.S.C.).
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chosen to live in a district where nuisance is commonplace. Thus, 
if one decides to live in an industrial zone, one cannot complain 
about noise or smell.40 However, a plaintiffs right of action is not 
automatically lost simply becuase he has “moved to the nuisance”,41 
and it is no defence for a polluter to rely on an industrial zone regu­
lation if he is causing a nuisance.42 Further, there has been some ex­
pression of Canadian judicial opinion to the effect that progress does 
not necessarily entail gross pollution.43 Thus, it does not seem unrea­
sonable to speculate that courts may soon circumscribe the ‘relative 
neighborhood’ rule through ‘judicial re-zoning’.44
The problem of ascertaining which of several defendants has 
caused damage is one common to the plaintiff in either a public or a 
private nuisance action.45 There are two ways to overcome this dif­
ficulty. Once all the probable defendants have been joined,46 the 
plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove his case.47 A 
polluter cannot exonerate himself merely because he contributed to 
existing pollution,48 nor can he argue successfully that his contribu­
tion was negligible.49 Unless pollution sources are monitored,50 a 
plaintiff can establish at least an inference that all of the defendants 
are severally liable via circumstantial evidence.
Another solution to the causation problem is to argue that the 
burden is on the several defendants to prove the extent of their in­
dividual contributions to the pollution.51 Once that has been estab­
lished, judgment can be allowed against any one of them. It would
40 Lucas, op. cit., at p. 18 notes that it is here that “physical injury” to property 
becom es invaluable to the action. See also R iver Park Enterprises v. Town o f  
Fort St. John, op. c it., p. 519.
41 D rysdale  v. D ucas, op. cit., p. 20.
42 Savage v. M cK enzie  (1961), 25 D.L.R. (2d) 175 (N.B.C.A.).
43 See the view of Puddester, J.. in K en t v. Dom inion Coal and S tee l Corp. ( 196s), 
49 D.L.R. (2d) 241 at pp. 257-262 (Nfld. C.A.).
44 McLaren, op. cit.. p. 535.
45 C. Wright, Special Lectures o f  the Law S ociety o f  U pper Canada  (Toronto, 
1953) p. 103.
46 Tortfeasor’s Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 232. s.2.
47 Wright, op. cit., is extremely relevant on this point.
48 W alker v. M cKinnon, (19491 4 D.L.R. 739.
49 Russell Transport Ltd. v. Ontario M alleable Iron Co., (1952) 4 D.L.R. 719.
50 See McLaren, op. c it., p. 542.
51 See Ehrlich and Ehrlich, op. cit. p. 365, and Brown  v. Town o f  M orden  (1958),
12 D.L.R. (2d) 576. See also K elly  v. Canadian Northern R w y., (1950] 2 D.L.R. 
760.
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then be open to the defendants to settle contribution among them­
selves.52
A concept that may seriously affect a nuisance suit is the ‘bal­
ancing of interests’ doctrine to which reference was made earlier. 
Briefly stated, the doctrine involves the weighing of the ‘social 
utility’ of a nuisance activity against the harm caused thereby.53 
At one time the courts generally ruled in favour of social utility.54 
Today the trend has changed.55 While the creation of jobs and a 
booming economy are still factors to be considered,56 Canadian 
Courts57 have lately shown an inclination to hold environmental 
interests paramount.58
The private nuisance action can be an effective device for en­
vironmental protection. Unlike the public nuisance suit, standing 
to sue is relatively easy to achieve and the difficulty of such obstacles 
as the ‘balancing of interests’ and ‘relative neighborhood’ doctrines 
is inversely proportional to a lawyer’s skill in persuading a court of 
the proper value to be ascribed to the environment.5 9
DEFENCES
Two main defences are available to the defendant in a nuisance 
suit. If the act complained of has continued for twenty years without 
objection from the plaintiff there exists a defence by way of prescrip­
tion. 60 But, the plaintiff m ust have been a ware of the ‘nuisance’ 
throughout the twenty year span61 and the act causing harm must 
have been constant in incidence and effect during the same period.62 
The difficulty inherent in meeting these stipulations makes the de­
fence of prescription rare.63
52 See Tortfeasor’s Act, s.2.
53 See B. W ilson, “A choice of Values" (1961 > 4 Canadian Bar Journal 448 at 
p. 434.
54 See Lmgley, L.J. in Shelfer  v. C ity o f  London E lectric Lighting C o., (1895] 
1 Ch. D. 287 at p. 316
55 See K en t  v. D om inion S teel C orp., op. cit.
56 See H ickey  v. E lectric R eduction  Co., op. cit.
57 See M cK ie  v. K V P  C o., (1948] 3 D.L.R. 201 (atfm’d [1949] S.C.R. 698); and 
G authier v. N aneff ( 1971), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 513 a. 519.
58 In this respect Canadian courts seem  to be more liberal than their American 
counterparts. See Reitze, op. cit. pp. 5-23.
59 See B. Wilson, op. cit., p. 456.
60 D eV ault v. Robinson  (1920), 591. This defence may not apply to public nui­
sance at all. See Reitze, op. cit., pp. 5-25.
61 See footnote 49.
62 Hulley v. Silversprings Co., [1922] 2 Ch. 268, and Fleming, op. cit., p. 367.
63 See McLaren, op. cit., p. 544.
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Reliance on statutory authority64 is the most common defence to 
a nuisance suit. Many large Canadian companies are incorporated 
by special Act and given immunity from nuisance actions.65 Such 
Acts fall under the head of ‘imperative legislation’. The immunity 
they bestow is air-tight.66 Where, however, the legislation is ‘per­
missive’. the authority granted by the Act is discretionary,67 the 
legislation is framed so that power granted thereunder can be exer­
cised only if it does not infringe private rights,68 or the Act contains 
no express provision as to tort liability,69 the defence of statutory 
authority will succeed.
If a defendant can show that the damage caused by his exercise 
of authority is inevitable70 he may have a valid defence. In such cases 
the burden of proving inevitability rests with the defendant who must 
show that all reasonable care and skill, in the light of contemporary 
scientific knowledge, has been observed in connection with the en­
terprise he undertakes.71
REMEDIES
The remedy very often sought by a plaintiff in a nuisance suit 
is an injunction. Interestingly, Canadian courts have shown them­
selves more liberal than their American counterparts in granting 
injunctions. While some decisions have followed the American 
view72 that only damages73 will be awarded where an injunction 
would lead to economic hardship,74 more recent cases indicate 
that the courts will exercise their discretion in granting injunctions
64 Even after a plaintiff has won a nuisance case, the court’s decision can be 
negatived by legislation. See K V P  Co. L td ., S.O. 1950, c. 33, s.l.
65 See Fundy Forest Industries L td ., S.N.B. 1971, c. 80, ss. 2,3,4; and M acM illan  
R othesay L im ited, S.N.B. 1970, c. 58, s. 5.
66 See Turpin v. Halifax-Dartmouth Bridge Com m ission  (1959), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 
623 at p. 625. However, one might try to sue in negligence, depending on the 
wording of the statute. See P rovender M illers v. Southam pton C .B .C ., [1940]
1 Ch. 131 at 140.
67 J.P. P orter Co. v. Bell, [1955] 1 D.L.R. 62 at p. 72 (N.S.C.A.).
68 Stephens  v. Village o f  R ichm ond Hill, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 572.
69 C onnery  v. G overnm ent o f  M anitoba  (1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 234.
70 See Flemming, op. cit. p. 366; also see footnote 68.
71 M anchester Corp. v. Farnsworth, [1930] A.C. 171 at p. 182; and Lawrysyn  
v. Kipling  (1965), 55 D.L.R. v2d) 471.
72 See Reitze, op. cit. pp. 5-27.
73 See Fleming, op. cit., at p. 370.
74 See R om bough  v. C restbrook T im ber Co. (1966), 55 W .W .R. 577.
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if a defendant is harming the environment.75
Damages of course are always an alternative to injunctive re­
lief and can be awarded on the merits of the case.76
Another possible remedy is abatement. The ‘privilege’ of abate­
ment is a self-help remedy, an alternative to damages.77 It is avail­
able only for a short time after knowledge of the nuisance activity 
is acquired and should be used only when an emergency does not 
allow resort to usual process.78 Notice of intent to abate must nor­
mally be given by the complainant.79 There are apparently no 
Canadian cases involving the use of this remedy.
75 Footnote 36; and Canada Paper Co. v. Brown (1922). 66 D.L.R. 287: and 
G roat v. E dm onton , [1928] 3 D.L.R. 725; 1928 S.C.R. 522.
76 Footnote 73.
77 Logan Navigation Co. v. Lam beg Bleaching Co. [1927] A.C. 226 at 244.
78 Reitze, op. c it., pp. 5-28.
79 Fleming, op. cit., p. 373.
